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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Since the offense did not meet either of the two
criteria, the Court held that the failure to register
for the draft was not a continuing offense; and
thus prosecution of petitioner Toussie was barred
by the statute of limitations.
Justice White, in dissent, was troubled by con-
ceived inconsistencies in Justice Black's opinion.
White argued that the Presidential order"s cited
by the government provided sound foundation
for treating a failure to register for the draft as a
"continuing offense." He insisted that the ma-
jority had erroneously concluded that "the regula-
tion was not authorized by the Universal Military
Training and Service Act," 4o even though section
10 of that Act granted the President such au-
thority.41
Justice Black emphasized, however, that the
Court did
not hold, as the dissent seems to imply, . . . that
the continuing-duty regulation is unauthorized
by the Act. All we hold is that neither the regu-
lation or the Act itself requires that failure to
board advised of one's address should still be held
continuous.
39 32 C.F.R. § 1611.7(c) (1970).
40 50 U.S.C. § 460(b). (1964) states that "the Presi-
dent is authorized-() to prescribe the necessary rules
and regulations to carry out the provisions of this
title."
41397 U.S. at 127 n. 1.
register be treated as the type of offense which
effectively extends the statute of limitations.4
The crux of this dilemma is that justice White
missed the logic of Justice Black's categories, one
of which stated that a continuing offense occurs
when the language of the statute, not the regula-
tion, compels that conclusion. The justification
for this category is that the statute of limitations
is a creature of the legislature. If the limitation is
to be extended with regard to a particular offense,
there must be explicit legislative direction. Justice
Black asserted that the regulation, though valid
for other administrative purposes,4 8 did not speak
for the legislature and therefore could not serve to
extend the statute of limitations.
21 Id. at 121 n. 17. In another footnote, Id. at 127
n. 2, Justice White, perplexed, responded:
[tihe majority seems concerned to distinguish the
'limitations question' ... from the question of
whether the duty in this case is continuing....
But the Court cannot have it both ways. If the
duty continues, as the regulation prescribes, the
limitations question has been settled.
4 See Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.
1949), where the Court upheld the authority of the
President to proclaim 32 C.F.R. § 1611.6(d). This case
concerned the prosecution of one who abetted another
to avoid the draft in violation of 50 U.S.C. § 462(a)
(1964). Although the defendant argued that the one who
had failed to register had already completed his crime
before the alleged illegal counseling, the court ruled
that the duty to register was continuing.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)
In Vale v. Louisiana' and Chambers v. Maroney2
the Court broadened the conceptual gap between
the law relating to the warrantless search of a
residence and the law relating to the warrantless
search of an automobile.' Vale held that a war-
rantless search of a suspect's house incident to his
arrest on the front porch was violative of the fourth
1399 U.S. 30 (1970).
2399 U.S. 42 (1970).
3 In the United States v. Kancso, 252 F.2d 220, 224
(2nd Cir. 1958), the court noted the distinction be-
tween the search of a residence and an automobile:
"There is a vast difference between entering and
searching homes... which are fixed and more or
less permanent locations and stopping a person or
car on a highway for the same purpose."
See also United States v. Buckner, 296 F.Supp 121
(D. Tenn. 1968); Johnson v. State, 8 Md. App. 28, 257
A.2d 756 (1969).
amendment. Chambers held that the search of an
automobile incident to an arrest based on probable
cause was reasonable even though it was conducted
several hours later and at a different location.
Probable cause to conduct the search at the time
of the arrest was held sufficient to justify dispensing
with a warrant for the subsequent search even
though there was ample time to obtain a warrant
in the interim.
When viewed from an absolute doctrinal posi-
tion which recognizes the vital mandates of fourth
amendment protection,4 the decisions appear in-
consistent; but when seen from the pragmatic
4 See, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217
(1969); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Nardone
v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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viewpoint of reasonability under the fourth amend-
ment,5 the cases evidence a growing dichotomy
between the permissible grounds for conducting a
warrantless search of a residence and those justify-
ing a warrantless search of an automobile.6
In Vale, the defendant was arrested on the front
stairs of his home immediately after the arresting
officers observed what appeared to be a sale of
narcotics to a known drug addict. The search of
defendant's home incident to the arrest revealed a
quantity of narcotics. Vale was convicted for pos-
sessing heroin and sentenced as a multiple offender
to fifteen years imprisonment. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana affirmed the conviction holding the
search reasonable because it was conducted "in the
immediate vicinity of the arrest" and was "sub-
stantially contemporaneous therewith." 7
The Supreme Court granted cerliorari8 and re-
versed the conviction. 9 Mr. Justice Stewart, speak-
ing for the majority, succinctly stated:
"If a search of a house is to be upheld as in-
cident to an arrest, that arrest must take place
inside the house." 10
Given the enormous breadth of judicial decision
holding the search of a residence incident to an
arrest in a location remote from the residence as
violative of the fourth amendment, it is inconceiv-
able that the Court could have reached a contrary
decision. n These decisions appear to be grounded
5 The fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963);
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). Cf. United
States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1957).
6 See note 3 supra.
7 State v. Vale, 252 La. 1056, 1070, 215 So. 2d 811,
816 (1968).
6 396 U.S. 813 (1969).
9 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). The convic-
tion was reversed 6-2. Mr. Justice Black, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, submitted a dissenting opinion.
Mr. justice Blackmun did not take part.
10 399 U.S. at 33-34 (emphasis in text). See Agnello v.
United States 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925):
"Belief, however well founded, that an article
sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes
no justification for a search of that place without a
warrant."
uSee e.g., Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969)
(arrest oc'cufed fifteen to twenty feet from residence);
James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36 (1965) (two blocks);
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel room
in another state two days after arrest); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (several blocks);
Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965) (sev-
eral blocks); United States ex rel. Claxk v. Maroney
339 F.2d 710 (3rd Cir. 1964) (nearby town); United
States ex rel. Mancini v. Runole, 337 F.2d 268 (3rd
Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker
323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), affrd, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)
on the unqualified right of an individual to be se-
cure from a warrantless police search while in his
own home.1 2 Although indisposed to prescribe
spatial dimensions between an arrest and a resi-
dence which may justify a warrantless search of
the suspect's home,13 the courts have predicated
the validity of such searches on the need to seize
weapons and the need to prevent the destruction
of the evidence of the crime1 4 Seizing upon this
justification the Louisiana Supreme Court, in af-
firming Vale's conviction, noted that the arresting
officers could not be sure that the evidence would
not be destroyed had they gone to obtain a war-
rant'
Justice Stewart circumvented the foregoing justi-
fication on the ground that the prosecution failed
to establish the existence of exceptional circum-
stances to sustain the warrantless search.' 6 Ex-
(six or seven blocks); Papani v. United States, 84 F.2d
160 (9th Cir. 1936) (several miles); United States v.
Shripshire, 271 F.Supp. 521 (D.La. 1967) three
blocks); Mc flvanie v. Middlebrooks, 265 F.Supp. 1004
(D. La. 1964) (half block); Pennsylvania ex rel. Whiting
v. Cavell, 244 F.Supp 560 (M.D. Pa. 1965), af'd, 358
F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1004
(1966) (ten miles); United States ex rel. Holloway v.
Reincke, 229 F.Supp. 132 (D. Conn. 1964) (within two
to three minute walk); United States v. Wai Lau, 215
F.Supp. 684 (S.D. N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 329 F.2d 310 (2nd
Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 856 (1965) (several
blocks); United States v. Scott, 149 F.Supp. 837 (D.
D.C. 1957) (down the street); People v. Delaney, 239
Cal. App. 2d 122, 48 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1965) (in front of
apartment); People v. Currier, 232 Cal. App. 2d 103,
42 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1965) (250 feet); Warwick v. State,
104 Fla. 393, 140 So. 219 (1932) (several blocks);
People v. Poncher, 358 Ill. 73, 192 N.E. 732 (1934)
(on a public street); People v. Garrett, 232 Mich. 366,
205 N.W. 95 (1925) (several blocks); May v. State,
199 So. 2d 635 (Miss. 1967) (while defendant was in
jail); State v. King, 84 N.J. Super, 297, 201 A.2d 758
(1964), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110
(1965) (in rear of premises); Commonwealth v. Pearson,
427 Pa. 45, 233 A.2d 552 (1967) (different city); State v.
Mc Collum, 17 Wash. 2d 85, 136 P.2d 165 (1943) (in a
hospital).
n But see, United States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499
(S.D. Cal. 1955), where the court held that because the
officers took the defendant two blocks from the loca-
tion of the arrest in order to search the garage adjacent
to his apartment there was an absence of the element of
reasonableness which is required to make the search
valid as an incident to the arrest.
"See United States v. Scott, 149 F.Supp. 837 (D.
D.C. 1957).
14 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 775 (1969); United
States ex rel. Holloway, 229 F.Supp. 132 (D. Conn.
1964).
11State v. Vale, 252 La. at 1070, 215 So. 2d at 816.
"'Th burden of demonstrating exceptional circum-
stances to justify the search of a dwelling rests with the
prosecution. See e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
775, 762 (1969); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,




ceptional circumstances have been held to validate
the warrantless search of a residence where the
police are responding to an emergency" or are in
hot pursuit of the suspect, s where the residence is
the scene of the suspect's criminal operations,19 and
where the suspect is observed removing contraband
from the residence. 0 However, absent a showing of
extreme necessity, Vale appears to impair the vital-
ity of decisions which have held the warrantless
search of a residence valid because the residence was
"substantially connected" with the arrest.21
While the Vale majority adhered to the abso-
lute sanctity of the home notion, the dissenters
subscribed to the reasonability of the search analy-
sis. Mr. justice Black, joined by Chief justice
Burger, noted:
"In my view, whether a search incident to a law-
ful arrest is reasonable should still be determined
by the facts and circumstances of each case." 22
Demanding that the risk of destruction of the
evidence was sufficient to invoke the "exceptional
circumstances" doctrine,2' justice Black noted
"7See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948); Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.
1932) (dictum).
'8See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967);
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1960);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
19 See, e.g., People v. Kendall, 212 Cal. App. 2d 472,
28 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1963); People v. Bach, 184 Cal. App.
2d 693, 7 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1960).20 See, e.g., Clifton v. United States, 224 F.2d 329
(4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 894 (1955);
Martin v. United States, 155 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1946).
2t In United States v. Jackson, 149 F.Supp 937 (D.
D.C. 1957), rev'd on otler grounds, 250 F.2d 772 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), the court held the search of a residence
incident to an arrest in an auto valid because it occurred
as soon after the defendant left the residence as the
officers could stop the auto. People v. Rodriguez, 238
Cal. App. 2d 682, 48 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 951 (1966) upheld a search where the apart-
ment itself was the scene of the alleged crime. Holding
that the commission of the crime for which the arrest
was made was connected with the dwelling, Riddle v.
State, 73 Okla. Crim. 419, 121 P.2d 1014 (1943), held
the search constitutionally valid. See also Patton v.
State, 43 Okla. Crim. 436, 279 P. 694 (1929); State v.
Beaupre, 149 Wash 675, 272 P. 26 (1928).
2Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), (dissenting
opinion). See also, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
34-36 (1963); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S;
56, 63-64 (1950).
2To support the proposition that a risk of destruc-
tion of the evidence could generate the "exceptional
circumstances" doctrine, Justice Black cited Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) and Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Preston and Carroll
involved the search of an auto and McDonald held the
warrantless search of a residence invalid.
a distinction between "exceptional circumstances"
and a reasonable search incident to an arrest.
2 4
This distinction appears tenuous when contrasted
with the majority's approach to Vale. Although
certain circumstances may justify a warrantless
search incident to an arrest without regard to ex-
ceptional circumstances, Vale indicates that the
sanctity of the residence is entitled to absolute
fourth amendment protection and that, absent
exceptional circumstances, the warrantless search
of a home cannot be justified.
The dichotomy in philosophical approach be-
tween the majority and minority in Vale is evi-
denced by their independent views concerning the
applicability of the Court's previous decision in
Chimel v. California5 Chimel held that a search
may be upheld as incident to an arrest where there
is a threat that the evidence may be destroyed
and where the search is confined to "the area from
within which [the suspect] might gain possession
of ... destructable evidence." 26 The majority felt
that Vale could be decided without reaching the
question of Chimel's retroactivity. This position
was ostensibly predicated on the basis that ex-
ceptional circumstances were absent because the
suspect could not gain possession of evidence in
his home when he was arrested on the front porch.
'Thus, because the arresting officers had no reason to
believe that someone else was present in the home
to destroy the evidence, the sanctity of the home
required a warrant before the home could be
searched. Contrarily, the dissenters felt that the
search in Vale was so patently reasonable that it
could be upheld without regard to the applica-
bility of Chimel.
27
In the absence of exceptional circumstances,
Vale's absolute sanctity of the home approach ap-
pears to erode the authoritative value of a signifi-
cant line of search and seizure cases.
28
24 See 399 U.S. at 38.
25 395 U.S. 752 (1965).
26
1 d. at 763.
2Theoretically, the majority's position is reinforced
by the fact that a search warrant could reasonably be
obtained before the suspect could be released on
bail and destroy the evidence. The dissenting opinion
noted that Vale's mother and brother did, in fact, come
home while the officers were conducting their search.
However, there was neither reason to believe that the
mother and brother knew of Vale's narcotic dealings
nor that they were aware of the presence of narcotics
in the home.
28 Vale appears to emasculate the authoritative
value of cases which upheld the validity of a warrant-
less search despite an arrest made remote from the locus
of the arrest. See, e.g., Hass v. United States, 344 F.2d
56 (8th Cir. 1965) (Defendant rented bedroom of
[Vol. 61
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An antithetical approach to the absolute posi-
tion invoked in Vale was takenin Chambers v.
Maroney29 where the Court held the warrantless
search of an automobile to be reasonable despite
the fact that it was conducted after the auto had
been removed to the police station and the immo-
bility of the auto permitted the police to obtain a
warrant. Mr. Justice White's majority opinion
noted the difference in approach to cases involving
residences and those involving automobiles: "for
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a
constitutional difference between houses and
cars." 10
In Chambers several people noticed an auto
speeding away from a service station which had
been robbed. Upon notification from the observers,
the police pursued the auto and arrested its oc-
cupants. The auto was driven to the police station
and searched without a warrant. Defendant was
convicted in state court and did not appeal. A
subsequent request for federal habeas corpus relief
was denied,31 the denial was affirmed,32 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.3
The Court found that the identification of the
auto and its occupants by the citizen observers
was sufficient to generate probable cause. 7 Al-
though probable cause to arrest is not always
equivalent to probable cause to search, 5 the police,
apartment and search of bedroom was upheld as "con-
tiguous" to arrest in living room); Williams v. United
States, 260 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 918 (1958) (search of stairway leading from de-
fendant's bedroom to a bathroom which he used was
upheld as incident to arrest in hallway outside of his
room); United States v. Charles, 8 F.2d 302 (N.D. Cal.
1925) (search of living quarters held incident to arrest
in lobby); United States v. Biegel, 254 F.Supp. 923
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) a.ff'd, 370 F.2d 751 (2nd Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1966) (search of apartment
incident to defendant's arrest with key in door about
to enter); People v. Dominguez, 191 Cal. App. 2d 704,
12 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1961) (search of apartment incident
to arrest on porch); People v. Boozer, 12 Ill. 2d 184,
145 N.E. 2d 619 (1957) (search of dwelling incident to
arrest on porch); People v. Newbern, 49 Misc. 2d 1007,
268 N.Y.S. 2d 758 (1966) (search of home incident to
arrest in yard).
22 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
10 Id. at 52.
31 United States ex rel. Chambers v. Maroney, 281
F.Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
32 408 F.2d 1186 (3rd Cir. 1969).
- 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
24Thus the Court sanctioned the view that specific
notification from an observer of a crime is sufficiently
reliable for probable cause purposes. This appears to be
in accord with the prevailing view. See, e.g., Pendleton
v. Nelson, 404 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1968); Brown v.
United States, 365 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
3For situations involving probable cause to arrest
but not to search, see, Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg.
on the facts of Chambers, had reason to believe
that the suspected robbers possessed weapons and
the fruits of their crime. Noting that automobiles
may be subject to a warrantless search in circum-
stances which would not justify the warrantless
search of a residence,"6 the Court held:
"For constitutional purposes, we see no differ-
ence between on the one hand seizing and holding
a car before presenting the probable cause issue to
a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an
immediate search without a warrant. Given proba-
ble cause to search, either course is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." 3
7
Thus, the Court found that the fourth amend-
ment's protection against unreasonable searches
does not preclude the warrantless search of an
auto after it has been removed from the location of
the arrest where the police had probable cause to
conduct the search at the time of the arrest. While
several courts have reached the same result by
determining that the search was part of a con-
tinuous sequence of events,5 a conflict remains as
to whether a search of an auto made subsequent
to the arrest of a suspect in a location remote
from the auto can be considered sufficiently inci-
dent to justify dispensing with a warrant. 9 How-
ever, contemporaneity is no longer an element of
the incidence of the search.40 Thus, exigent circum-
Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364 (1964). Whether there is a distinction be-
tween the requirements for issuance of an arrest war-
rant and a search warrant remains a matter of specula-
tion. But see Comment, Search and Seizure in the Su-
preme Court: Shadows of the Fourth Amendment, 28 U.
CHx L. REv. 664, 687 (1961).36 A long line of Supreme Court cases has tested the
circumstances under which an auto can be search. See
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216
(1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967);
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Beinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
37 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
381ee, e.g., Rhodes v. United States, 224 F.2d 348
(5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Erskine, 248 F.Supp.
137 (D. Oregon 1965); People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 101,
56 Cal. Rptr. 902,424 P.2d 342 (1967); People v. Lewis,
34 Ill 2d 211, 215 N.E. 2d 283 (1966).
39 Compare Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d
983 (8th Cir. 1965) cert. denied, 384 U.S. 944 (1965);
United States v. Berhart, 326 F.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1964)
with Staples v. United States, 320 F.2d 817 (5th Cir.
1963); Conti v. Morgenthau, 232 F. Supp. 1004
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pettit v. State, 207 Ind. 478, 188 N.E.
784 (1934); People v. Harper, 365 Mich. 494, 113 N.W.
2d 808 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 930 (1962).
40 But see Glisson v. United States, 406 F.2d 423
(10th Cir. 1969); Barnett v. United States, 384 F.2d
848 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d
19701
